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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
before the execution of the codicil the granddaughter's stepfather adopted
her. Consequently, it may be assumed that with respect to this grand-
daughter, testator's will expresses his desires as to the portion of his sub-
stantial estate she should receive.
The technical issue in the instant case is whether certain charities
named in the will can take, since testator died within a year of the execu-
tion of the will and the codicil. If under the Ohio mortmain statute
testator was survived by any "lineal descendant," then the bequests to
charities are invalid. The probate court properly construed the mortmain
statute and the adoption statute mn parn inateria. Therefore, the charitable
bequests are valid because after the testator's granddaughter was adopted
by her stepfather, under the mortmain statute she was no longer a "lineal
descendant" of the testator - her paternal, natural grandfather.
2. Inheritance by Descendants of Maternal Grandparents
If a decedent dies intestate survived by two uncles and an aunt who
are descendants of his maternal grandparent and is survived by no paternal
grandparents or descendants of paternal grandparents, the two uncles and
the aunt take to the exclusion of a great-uncle's children who are de-
scendants of his paternal great-grandparents.36
ROBERT N. COOK
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Occasionally, a classic case emerges to grace the pages of an annual
survey. In the workmen's compensation field two such cases came over
the horizon last year - a rare and exciting legal treat indeed. Both cases
demand extensive study.
In Johnson v. Industrtal Comm'iz' the Supreme Court attempted to
resolve a long standing conflict over when, if ever, a disease can be called
an injury to permit compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. The majority opinion, written by Judge Taft, excellently analyzes
the development of Ohio law on this subject, sharply distinguishes four
prior cases dating back as far as 1918, and overrules two cases (one as
recent as 1947) The details of this major legal operation are included
in the following summary-
'In re Estate of Kelly, 165 Ohio St. 259, 135 N.E.2d 378 (1956).
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Suffice it to say that at least in the eyes of four Supreme Court judges
the Workmen's Compensation Law now means this: to be eligible for
compensation for death, an injury must be established proximately causing
the death; since "occupational diseases" are not comprehended within the
term "injuries," diseases other than "occupational diseases" are not com-
pensable; the term "injury" does not include disease; pneumonia cannot
be an "injury", and weakened resistance to infection from pneumonia
even though it represents a derangement of bodily functions is not an
.injury."
The majority viewed their decision as making definite and certain
complicated precedents on a complex problem. Exactness in the law is
meritorious, especially in the workmen's compensation area, where simple
rules are the goal to provide injured workmen or their dependents with
speedy compensation at a minimum of expense. Forty years of litigation
on this subject, however, have produced complex rules, caused expensive
lawsuits and delayed compensation. It remains to be seen, however,
whether the majority's attempt to recast the disease-injury issue in sun-
pie, exact terms will achieve the basic purposes of workmen's compensa-
tion. Three judges dissented from the reasoning and opinion, although
they did join in the judgment. Two dissenters contended that there was
a lack of evidence of a recognizable "accident" in the instant case upon
which to affix the disease of pneumonia to make it compensable. All
three dissenters concurred in the belief that Sebek and Bartholome should
not be overruled on the issue of a disease being an injury.
Six months after the Johnson case the second classical case was de-
cided. In Dripps v. Goodyear Tire and Rabber Co.2 the employee was a
"swing line man" on a boom. For nine weeks prior to the incident he
had been exerting greater pull on the line because the boom had become
unbalanced. While applying tension to the line, the employee claimed
that he was injured when "all of a sudden something just came down on
my shoulder and dear on out to the fingers like an electric shock or
something like it might have hit my crazy bone."3 No outside agency
struck the claimant. A majority of five judges held that "injury" as re-
quired by the law comprehended a "physical or traumatic damage or harm
accidental in character and as a result of external and accidental means in
the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap, occurring by chance, un-
expectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and
place."4  Disability resulting merely from exerting more effort or being
1164 Ohio St. 297, 130 N.E.2d 807 (1955)
2165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E.2d 873 (1956)
11d. at 408, 135 N.E.2d at 874.
'Id. at 408, 135 N.E.2d at 875, quoting from Toth v, Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St.
1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953)
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subjected to greater strain in itself is not compensable. One member of
the majority contended that the present decision overruled two prior cases
and urged that the court so state to avoid confusion. In Malone v. Indus-
trzal Comm'n,5 a worker in the 1130 temperature of a foundry on a hot
August day collapsed from heat exhaustion and died within 12 hours; and
in Maynard v. B. F Goodrich Co." the employee lifted a heavy roll of
fabric severely straining his back which prevented working and termi-
nated in death. Both cases granted compensation. The unanimous court
in the latter case relied on the Malone decision and further stated that
since the Workmen's Compensation Act was amended to include "any
injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's
employment, ' the statute now does not expressly require the injury to be
accidental. Cases decided prior to the amendment had denied compensa-
ton for injury sustained while lifting heavy objects.8 The court in the
Maynard case indicated the amendment changed the meaning of injury to
exclude the requirement of accidental.
The two dissenting judges in the Dripps case expressed the belief that
the amendment now included "any injury" not merely accidental injury;
thus the Malone and Maynard cases were good law and should be fol-
lowed.
On the same day that the Dripps decision was rendered, the Supreme
Court held that stacking "reroll liners" to a height of seven feet instead
of the normal five which caused a back injury was not compensable, for
no sudden mishap or happening occurred and thus no legal injury existed
In both the Johnson and Drtpps cases legal fermentation over the
complex issue of what is an injury is apparent.
This legal fermentation is also displayed in the major changes pro-
vided by the 1955 amendments to the law. One of the new provisions
reached the interpretation stage of the trial court on an employer appeal
from the Industrial Commission order. After the notice of appeal, con-
taining the name of the claimant, employer and administrator of the
Bureau of Workmens Compensation with the claim number, had been
filed, the employee moved to make the notice definite and certain. The
court denied the motion as the notice satisfied the statutory requirements
for appeal to the common pleas court."0
r140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266 (1942)
144 Ohio St. 22, 56 N.E.2d 195 (1944).
7 Oiiio REv. CODE § 4123.01.
8Matczak v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 139 Ohio St. 181, 38 N.E.2d 1021
(1942); Industrial Commn v. Franken, 126 Ohio S. 299, 185 N.E. 199 (1933).
1 Artis v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 165 Ohio St. 412, 135 NXE.2d 877 (1956).
10Bilek v. Cleveland, 134 N.E.2d 600 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
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Another case decided by the Supreme Court also involved the 1955
amendments, in which the court granted an original writ of procedendo
ordering the Industrial Commission to order the Board of Review and ad-
ministrator to proceed with a hearing on relator's appeal in a compensa-
tion proceeding. Employer-relator's procedure was proper. The sole ap-
peal from the Board or Industrial Commission is on claimant's right to
participate. Where the commission or board wrongfully denies jurisdic-
tion to hear, no adequate remedy at law exists and the extraordinary
remedy is available."
Further agitation can be found in the social aspects of compensation.
An emerging concept appears to be that the wage earner and his family
should be protected from any death, injury or disease not merely those
associated with employment. Witness the union contracts with accident
and health benefits for the worker.
The economic aspect of Ohio Workmen's Compensation also con-
tinues under most active discussion. This gigantic insurance business
operated by the state government involves annual premiums totalling
$99,000,000; 340,000 annual claims which require over $60,000,000 in
compensation payments; 120,000 insured risks and a reserve fund of
$250,000,000. Insurance rates, benefits paid, and costs of administration
influence greatly the location of new industry and commerce in the state
as well as the retention of present businesses. The issue of whether to
allow private insurance carriers to operate in Ohio remains sharp also as
an economic factor.
Finally, the political implications of workmen's compensation are not
so obvious but may well be the most dynamic. With the extension of
the Federal Social Security program on July 1, 1957, to permit payments
to the permanently and totally disabled worker at 50 years of age the first
major federal recognition of the worker's physical disability has begun.
Will the federal program be extended to cover all workers regardless of
age? Temporary disability? Partial disability? The history of the So-
cial Security program has been one of continual expansion of benefits.
Will a Federal Social Security program evolve to submerge the present
state's workmen's compensation programs sub silentio in the next decade
or two?
Two other cases in 1956 wrestled with the proximate cause issue. The
need for words of probability to connect the trauma to the physical dis-
ability was dearly reemphasized. When the medical expert stated that
the blow had a 'bearing on" the cause of the condition, had a "detrimental
effect on the man's chance of recovery," was "bad," or "deleterious" the
"' State ex rel. Federated Dept. Stores v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 521, 138 N.E.2d 248
(1956)
Uun e
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court held the relation was not probable but conjectural.' 2  To instruct
the jury on the requisites of proximate cause poses a real challenge. Just
because a jury asks for further instructions on the issue is not enough to
indicate that the jury was confused so as to warrant setting aside the
verdict for defendant.' 3 The trial judge incidentally used the following
words to describe proximate cause: "direct result," "dose," "near," "with-
out this injury there would be no disability" and "proximate cause is the
real cause."
A divorced wife was held not to be a dependent, so that no attach-
ment for nonpayment of alimony could be made upon the employee's
compensation payment due.' 4 A father could not recover reimbursement
for his son's funeral expenses, for he was not a dependent."S
An additional award for violation of specific safety requirements was
considered in one case. Whether a violation of a specific safety require-
ment existed was a fact exclusively for Industrial Commission determina-
tion. However, the issue of whether the requirement was specific was
a question of law which was appealable to the courts.' 6
In other cases it was held: that the statutory amendment eliminating
unanimous approval of the Commission before additional medical bene-
fits could be paid was a substantive change, so the rule in effect at the
time of injury was applicable;' 7 that an interrogatory on the claimant's
ability to do the same work was rightly refused, for compensation is not
based on this element;' a hypothetical question which includes a fact not
in evidence was defective, so medical opinion based thereon must be ex-
cluded;19 sufficient medical evidence also existed to support a dependent
claimant's verdict for a death award where the worker was burned on the
leg, was given first aid, worked through the following day, was at home
three months before returmng to work, quit work one year after the inci-
dent, became bedfast 27 months after, 35 months later had uremic poi-
soning, died 47 months from the incident, having been under employer's
medical care during the entire period.2 0
OLIVER SCHROEDER, JR.
"Kanoff v. Industrial Comm n, 99 Ohio App. 357, 133 N.E.2d 635 (1954)
"Plothow v. General Motors Corp., 131 N.E.2d 687 (Ohio App. 1954)
a, Bruce v. Bruce, 100 Ohio App. 121, 130 N.E.2d 433 (1955).
'5State ex rel. Pyles v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 N.E.2d 628 (Ohio App. 1953)
"State ex rel. O'Neill v. Troy Sunshade Co., 99 Ohio App. 115, 131 N.E.2d 837
(1954).
'State ex rel. Jeffrey v. Industrial Comm n, 164 Ohio St. 366, 131 N.E.2d 215
(1955)
"Mdntyre v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 137 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio App. 1955)
"Olsen v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 164 Ohio St. 283, 130 N.E.2d 363 (1955)
' O'Hara v. Republic Steel Corp., 132 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio App. 1954)
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